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Prudence, Information, and Trust Investment Law
by John A. Humbach and Stephen P. Dresch

Professors Langbein and Posner recently proposed
that fiduciaries be allowed t o invest in market funds
under a relaxation of the prudent investor standard.
But a relaxation of the selectivity requirements may
be destructive of capital market efficiency and
perhaps of the capital markets themselves.

T H E MANAGEMENT of assets and portfolios,
I Nfiduciaries
are required to meet a standard of care
known typically as the prudent investor standard. When
applying this standard, courts historically have tended to
consider each of the fiduciary's investment decisions
separately. Losses owing to careless judgments may not
be offset by gains from investments more carefully
selected. To avoid surcharge, the fiduciary must meet
the requisite duty of care with respect to every investment. Meeting this duty involves substantial expense in
time and money, and this expense must be deducted from
the over-all performance of the portfolio.
In their recent article in this Journal (July, page
887), "The Revolution in Trust Investment Law," John
H. Langbein and Richard A. Posner, professors of law at
the University of Chicago, suggested that the prudent
investor standard ought to be changed. Rather than each
of a fiduciary's investment decisions being viewed separately, they assert, the fiduciary's exercise of care in
certain cases ought to be judged on the basis of his
selection of the portfolio as a whole.
The Market Fund Portfolio

The purpose of this revision would be to permit
fiduciaries to invest in so-called market fund portfolios.
These are highly diversified, broadly based collections of
securities purchased rather nonselectively and, once
purchased, held more or less indefinitely. The objective
of the market fund approach is to create a portfolio that
parallels on a miniature scale the diversity and proportionate values of the market as a whole and, accordingly,
will perform about as well or as badly as the general
market.
In support
of their proposed revision, Professors
- Langbein and Posner argue essentially as follows:
The traditional practice of picking and choosing particular stocks for portfolio inclusion or sale involves

substantial costs, both in gathering information on which
to make decisions and in effectuating purchases and sales
in conformity with those decisions. These costs are unrewarded since the competition among "prudent" investors, who all must rely on the same general information
sources, tends to cancel out any gains that informed
judgments could provide. It is apparently the recent experience of mutual funds that none has outperformed the
market with a consistency greater than the law of averages would predict. Optimal results in portfolio management are obtainable by simply buying and holding the
stocks of every issuer in proportion to the value each
issuer's outstanding stocks bears to the aggregate value
of all outstanding stocks. Then we can fire all of the
securities analysts, save most of the brokerage fees, and
still have a portfolio that will perform about as well as any
other.
There is, we can see, a certain logic in asserting that
fiduciaries should not be required to evaluate and choose
individual stocks for their portfolios. If the same results
are obtainable at lesser management cost by blind diversification alone, then portfolio managers who are not
almost totally passive are simply wasting their principals' money.
Professors Langbein and Posner describe their new
standard ofprudence as a "revolution in trust investment
law." Insofar as they imply that calculated ignorance is
really the most prudent approach to investment, their
suggestions call for quite a revolution indeed. The question their analysis appears to overlook, however, is
whether, more broadly viewed, it would be good public
policy to require or even to condone observance by
fiduciaries of the ignorance-as-prudence standard. When
the over-all effects on capital markets are considered,
there is good reason to conclude that the "revolutionary'' standard of Professors Langbein and Posner would
not be good public policy.
The Functioning of Capital Markets

From a social point of view, perhaps the most irnportant function of competitive capital markets is to allocate
capital resources among operating firms in a way that
maximizes the productivity of society's aggregate capital
assets. In practice this result is achieved by competitive
bidding for investment dollars among the various securities issuers who desire to use those dollars for the
purchase of "real" capital (machinery, plants, working
capital, and the like). In exchange for investment dollars,
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these competitive bidders offer participations in streams
of future earnings which, it is anticipated, their respective firms can produce. When capital market investors
purchase the stocks of firms having the best prospects of
highest percentage returns, the result is to allocate
monetary capital (and hence "real" capital) to the uses
most likely to result in the maximum economic benefit.
Of course, almost all securities trading is in existing
shares-the substitution of one investor's dollars for the
dollars some other investor already has placed in an
outstanding stock issue. Nonetheless, under a free enterprise system of production, the competitive prices
developed from this "secondary" trading in common
stocks can be seen as essential if "real" capital is to be
efficiently allocated to its optimal uses. In any event, the
price generating process of active trading is essential to
permit investors of monetary capital to distribute their
dollars among securities having return, risk, and riskvariance characteristics they desire.
If Market Fund Portfolios Were to Predominate
The capital market's price generating process cannot
work efficiently-and it cannot allocate capital to its
most productive uses-unless investors in the capital
market pick and choose intelligently among competing
investment opportunities. If investors blindly purchase
and retain some of every stock offered, the result will be
a nonoptimal and "irrational" allocation of both investment dollars and "real" capital assets. Promising and
nonpromising uses of capital alike would share arbitrarily in the limited supply of capital. The prices of all
stocks, moreover, would be frozen (irrespective of
changing returns, risks, etc.) at the relative levels
reached once the last investors discovered the logic of
totally passive market fund investment.
Professors Langbein and Posner admit that the capital
market would cease to be efficient if all investors adopted
the passive "buy-the-market-and-hold" strategy. In
fact, it would almost cease to be at all. For the most part,
the only remaining types of transactions would be those
involved in the purchases of wholly new issues and those
required in order to place net increments or to recover
net decrements in the aggregate of investment dollars.
Professors Langbein and Posner suggest that trading
also would be necessary "when substantial changes in
the market price of a security require its inclusion or
exclusion from the portfolio in order to maintain the
portfolio's fidelity to the market as a whole." This is,
however, erroneous. If the market price of a security
changed, thus altering the relationship between its value
in aggregate and the aggregate value of all securities in
the relevant market, the price change itself would simultaneously effectuate a corresponding alteration within a
market fund portfolio. Unless resort be had to a picking
and choosing strategy-for example, selecting securities
for inclusion or exclusion in the relevant marketthere would be no justification for altering holdings in
response to changes in market price.
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In connection with increments-decrements transactions, there also might be a certain amount of reshuffling
activity as market fund investors changed in size relative
to each other and as new investors entered or old ones
left the "industry." However, there would be no logical
place for the active public trading markets that now exist
for common stocks, and one would expect those markets
to be quickly replaced by a decentralized "market"
dominated by privately negotiated transfers. The question may be asked: Who would be available to negotiate
competently these private transfers once all of the
analysts had been dispensed with? This problem, however, is only an offshoot of the primary paradox posed by
the Langbein-Posner proposal.
Professors Langbein and Posner deny that the capital
market would freeze in this Vonnegutesque fashion as
the application of their strategy crystallized into reality.
They point out that there still would be "many other
investors" who would be willing to continue incurring
information and transactions costs and using their hardbought information to bid up undervalued stocks and bid
down overvalued ones. We are told that "enormous
gains" would be available to these inveterate traders,
and we assume, although are not told, that enormous
losses also would be available. In any event, however,
the activities of these traders supposedly would mean
that stock prices would continue to be established in
competitive trading and that the market would remain
efficient as an allocator of capital. The passive market
fund investors could enjoy a free ride on the information
and transactions expenditures others would incur in
order to keep the relative pricing of securities economically rational.
The Free Ride for Market Fund Investors
From a policy viewpoint, three observations may 'be
made concerning this free ride.
First, if those who are involuntarily piggybacked happen not to be representative in their attitudes toward the
factors influencing stock prices-for examples, risk and
return, risk-adversity, economic conditions affecting the
issuer, and the like-then the relative prices developed in
trades among them will not be representative either. By
"representative" prices, we mean the prices that would
be established if all investors were active in the pricing
process, not just a self-selected few.
There is no reason to believe that the insistent traders
or the prices they establish would be representative. In
the first place, once the Langbein-Posner insights become generally known, the traders would have to be
persons willing to ignore the obvious advantage to the
individual of applying the passive, market fund strategy.
The remaining traders probably would be (if rational) at
least more risk seeking than the norm, and the price
patterns they generate would reflect this. Worse yet, if
the thesis is correct about the self-cancelling effects of
competitive trading, those traders may have to be practically risk oblivious, not unlike horse bettors who know
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that the odds are always substantially against them but
hope to beat the odds nonetheless. To the extent that
capital allocations were heavily influenced by these persons' decisions, aggregate rates of return and production
would decline; that is, stocks having a sufficiently high
risk variance would be able to command new capital
from these investors even though offering a relatively
lower expected return. As a result, the rate of return to
the aggregate of capital would decline; that is, production
would decline.
Second, even if those who were piggybacked did constitute an attitudinal cross-section of all investors, almost
by definition they would not be representative in terms of
resources available for gathering information. This is
because the market fund strategy can be used only; by
investors or investor pools having large amounts of capital. The investors who will withdraw from the price
generating process will be precisely those who are likely
to be best informed and whose information is likely, by
the magnitude of their trades, to have the maximum
impact on prices. Much of the rationalizing effect on
prices would certainly be lost if, as Professors Langbein
and Posner appear to suggest, fiduciary investors were
legally required to apply the market fund strategy to
portfolio management. But even if the market fund
strategy were not a legal requirement for fiduciaries,
condoning the use of the strategy will cost the market and
society its best endowed and probably best informed
participants in the capital allocation process. Capital
markets would continue to reach equilibria as the perceived expectations of the traders changed. However,
the equilibria reached, and the capital allocations based
on them, would be distorted to the extent that the curtailment of information inputs distorts the over-all "market judgment" concerning the relative values of stocks.
How Important Is Informed Trading?
The third observation, which arises from the second,
is that Professors Langbein and Posner are erroneous in
assuming that if some investors are willing to make a
market, then active and informed trading by others is
"unnecessary and unprofitable. "
Active selection, rejection, and rearrangment of
portfolios-that is, active, informed trading-is constantly required of all investors if the market's equilibria and capital allocations are to be based on the
maximum possible input of information and attitudes.
Suggesting that the market can get by on less information
is rather like suggesting that it is unnecessary to vote. It
is true that the advantages secured through information
and transactions costs are generally cancelled out by
similar advantages others have secured to themselves.
But all this says is that, once the market closely approaches an equilibrium position, information from
which that equilibrium position can be inferred and on
which it is based is
No surprises there' The
important thing, from a policy viewpoint, is to be sure
that the patterns of prices existing at equilibrium are the
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best possible market estimates of the "right" prices for
purposes of optimal capital allocation.
To get the best possible market estimates, the input of
the greatest possible number of informed individual estimates is required. As these individual estimates are
"voted in" by bids and offers, many (most?) will be
cancelled out by others. At equilibrium, all will be cancelled out. But if there are abstainers, unless their selection as such is statistically random, the pattern of prices
at equilibrium will be nonrepresentative. If the abstainers are those likely to be best informed, moreover, the
equilibrium price pattern will probably be less maximizing than if there were no abstentions. This is because,
presumably, the better the over-all knowledge of
traders, the more efficient will be the market. Thus, in
order to allocate capital as efficiently as possible, informed trading by all investors, particularly wellendowed ones (such as, typically, fiduciaries) is necessary.
The Social Cost of Abstaining Investors
Finally, there is the question whether active, informed
trading by a portfolio manager is unprofitable. In answering this question, it must be asked: Unprofitable compared with what? If Professors Langbein and Posner
mean that active, informed trading is unprofitable compared with free loading, they are undoubtedly correct.
On the other hand, if they mean that it is socially unprofitable to have every investor engage in largely duplicative and self-cancelling securities analysis and
portfolio rearrangement, the correctness of the assertion
is more problematical.
On a cost-benefit basis, the cost of absentions by investors is the lost production that results from a greater
or lesser misallocation of capital resources. The benefits
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of abstention are, of course, the savings in information
and transactions expenditures. Whether the costs of
abstentions outweigh the benefits, or vice versa, is a
matter for the perspicacious. We, at least, are not able to
discern whether having abstainers in the market process
is profitable or unprofitable. We would note, however,
that better information should allocate capital more
beneficially than worse information and that the sources
of information we should least like to excuse are those
who can most accurately and efficiently (cost per dollar
of investment) serve as such.
Implications for Policy Concerning Market Funds
What conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing?
First, it is submitted that a market-fund investment
strategy, although perhaps individually advantageous, is
socially disadvantageous and that it would be bad policy
to condone, much less require, that strategy. Given the
financial analyses referred to and developed by Professors Langbein and Posner, and which in the main we do
not dispute, this would appear to mean that in practice no
investment portfolio could be expected consistently to
exceed or even to match the performance of broadly
based common stock indices. That the indices' performance cannot be consistently exceeded appears simply

to be a fact of life, inherent in the nature of capital
markets. That the performance cannot ev'en be equalled
would merely be the result of a policy decision-that
information and transaction costs must be borne and free
loading must be disallowed. But it appears to be an
appropriate policy decision nonetheless.
There is no reason in principle why certain portfolios
should be entitled to perform as well as an imaginary,
frictionless-world portfolio, such as the Standard and
Poor's 500. Transactions costs and information costs are
a part of doing business. On the other hand, by attempting to save the costs of informed investment decisions,
portfolios managers in effect would be trying to evade
their fair share contribution to the costs of effectuating
rational allocations of capital. Just because this particular social function--capital allocation-happens' in the
free enterprise system to be decentralized (unlike, say,
national defense), it does not follow that attempted evasions of one's aliquot support for this function are any
less to be condemned.
Only by requiring portfolio managers to use due care in
selecting each issue for purchase and sale can the capital
allocation process itself be said to be operated with due
care. Revolutions that corrode the efficiency of free enterprise ought to be eschewed. A

